Do “We” Have a Stake in This War?  
A Worldwide Test of the In-Group Out-Group Hypothesis  
Using Open-Source Intelligence

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Abstract

International relations scholars have long suspected that popular support for war is structured in part by in-group reactions to out-group threats. Huntington’s (1993, 1996) “clash of civilizations” hypothesis is one of the most controversial and under-tested extensions of this perspective within international relations. Most of the studies to quantitatively test Huntington’s hypothesis have examined the outcomes of group conflict, asking whether militarized interstate disputes are more likely across than within civilizations. Our study takes a different approach by examining the patterns of discourse that activate group conflict, focusing on a single militarized interstate dispute: the 2003 invasion of Iraq. For over 70 years, the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) has monitored the world’s press, translating broadcast, print, and internet news content into English from vernacular coverage from almost every country in the world. Our analysis of FBIS data before, during, and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq reveals patterns of ingroup discourse that are mostly inconsistent with Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” hypothesis. Ingroup discourse was prevalent in worldwide news coverage about Iraq, but this ingroup discourse tends to be structured at the level of individual nation-states rather than common cultures.


1 The authors thank the Cline Center for Democracy at the University of Illinois for its support of this project.
Since it was first proposed over a century ago by sociologist Goerg Simmel (1898a, 1898b), the idea that human conflicts are structured within ingroup-outgroup processes has been a central theme across the social sciences. An extensive body of observational and experimental research spanning multiple disciplines supports the basic premise that external threats from outgroups tend, under the right conditions, to produce internal cohesion among ingroups (Coser 1956; for reviews, see Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002; Brewer 2007; Kelman 2006; Levy 1989; Levine and Kerr 2007; Stein 1976). Although much of this research has been studied with experiments on small groups, its core insights have been of keen interest to international relations scholars.

Within the field of international relations, ingroup-outgroup dynamics are thought to be an important precursor of violent conflict both within (e.g., Kinder and Kam 2009; Roeder 2003) and across nation-states (e.g., Fearon 1998; Foyle and Belle 2010; Moore and Tarar 2010). Perhaps the most controversial and contested application of ingroup-outgroup processes within the field of international relations has been Samuel Huntington’s (1993, 1996) “clash of civilizations” hypothesis. Huntington observes that “as people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion.” The core claim of Huntington’s thesis is that the collective identities underlying social conflict are increasingly being defined at the level of entire cultures rather than at the level of ideologies or individual nation-states, as in past centuries. Conflicts are thus more likely today than in the past to become aggregated to the level of entire civilizations, pitting religion against religion and one type of people against another.²

As Russett and coauthors (Russett, Oneal, and Cox 2000: 585) note of Huntington’s thesis, “At its heart is the distinction between the in-group and the outsider, with in-group cohesion attained by

² The critiques of Huntington’s thesis are so many and varied that they cannot be reviewed in any detail here. Recent reviews of the debate over Huntington’s hypothesis can be found in (Chiozza 2002; Fox 2002; Henderson and Tucker 2001; Norris and Inglehart 2002; Roeder 2003; Russett, Oneal, and Cox 2000).
nurturing conflict with those that are different.” Despite this understanding of the process by which an ingroup-outgroup dynamic leads to violent conflict, the few studies undertaken by international relations scholars to quantitatively test ingroup-outgroup conflicts in general and Huntington’s thesis in particular have mainly looked for the outcomes of cultural clashes. And not just any outcomes, but the most extreme and therefore least likely outcome that any group conflict could possibly produce: militarized interstate disputes. It is perhaps unsurprising that little clear evidence of culture clash has yet been found at this level (e.g., Chiozza 2002; Fox 2002; Henderson and Tucker 2001; Roeder 2003; Russett, Oneal, and Cox 2000): such disputes are so rare and so overdetermined by multiple causal factors that clear quantitative evidence at this level of analysis may be nearly impossible to come by.

In contrast, little quantitative attention has been given to how the nurturing of group conflict occurs in the first place. This is an important omission, because the conflict-nurturing process is readily observable at two levels: the individual-level raw material of latent values, beliefs, and social identities that ultimately structure the fault lines along which group conflicts occur, and the societal-level discourse processes that activate these latent ingroup identities by focusing public attention on collective problems and outgroup threats. Chiozza (2002) observes that “In Huntington’s framework, ‘who are you?’ has become the central question of 21st-century world politics” (714). We would extend this view to suggest that from the standpoint of social identity theory (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1986; more generally, see Huddy 2003; Huddy 2004; Price 1989), there are two central questions: “Who are ‘we’, and do ‘we’ have a stake in this particular conflict?”

Although it is difficult to identify with quantitative data when a specific outcome has been definitively caused by an ingroup-outgroup conflict (Huddy 2003), the process of fomenting social animosity is easier to pin down using quantitative methods. Within the public opinion literature, opinion surveys, experimental and observational methods have been used to identify the latent group cleavages that await activation (e.g., Berinsky 2009; Kam and Kinder 2007; Kam and Ramos 2008;
Kinder and Kam 2009; see also Davis and Silver 2004), while analysis of specific threat contexts and patterns of societal communication have been used to identify the discourse that activates these latent cleavages (e.g., Althaus and Coe 2011; Davies, Steele, and Markus 2008; Nisbet and Myers 2010). Cues carried in social discourse about the nature and dimensions of group conflict are the key element. Contrary to Huntington’s thesis, social psychologists have shown the effects of enduring social identities that structure conflict in the world are not constant (e.g., Briley, Morris, and Simonson 2000; Gardner, Gabriel, and Lee 1999; Hong and Mallorie 2004; Hong et al. 2000; Huddy 2003, 2004; Kemmelmeier et al. 2003; Kinder and Kam 2009; Trafimow et al. 1997; Trafimow, Triandis, and Goto 1991). Because the relevant social identities are latent, to have an effect they must be activated by the environment in which individuals are situated. For international militarized disputes, the most likely environmental mechanism for activating these ingroup identities consists of ingroup cues contained in news discourse about the social dimensions of conflict processes. For example, a recent study of news exposure patterns in Middle Eastern countries found that people with high levels of exposure to pan-Arab satellite news channels like al-Jazeera or al-Aribiya were more likely to identify themselves with a transnational identity like “Muslim” or “Arab” than with a national identity like “Saudi Arabian” or “Jordanian” (Nisbet and Myers 2010). In a world of “us against them” (Kinder and Kam 2009), news discourse tells us both who “we” are and why we should care about the problem posed by “them.”

The problem comes in extending these approaches in ways that allow for comparative, cross-national analysis of ingroup-outgroup processes before, during, and after a major international conflict. The few cross-national survey-based studies to have tested Huntington’s thesis find that the latent cleavages underlying cultural conflicts are often different than originally supposed (e.g., Inglehart and Norris 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2002). But even these impressive studies are necessarily cross-sectional, and the costs of fielding multinational surveys ensure that only a handful of potentially relevant countries can be surveyed. Likewise, while the small number of comparative,
cross-national studies of news discourse have illuminated important nuances that contribute to social conflict processes (e.g., Aday, Livingston, and Hebert 2005; Åsard and Bennett 1997; Ferree, Gamson, and Gerhards 2002; Kolmer and Semetko 2009; Wu 2000), to our knowledge no previous study has analyzed cross-national discourse in ways that directly test for the discourse elements that activate ingroup identities within the context of outgroup threats.

This paper offers a test of the ingroup-outgroup hypothesis using a cross-national analysis of ingroup discourse from nearly every country in the world around the time of the 2003 American-led invasion of Iraq. If ever there was an ideal test for Huntington’s claim that a “clash of civilizations” between Islam and the West is a prominent feature of contemporary conflict around the world, the Second Gulf War is surely it. A war of choice by the West against a sovereign Arab republic, championed by an American president famous for invoking his Christian faith as the polestar for all his political decisions, justified with questionable pretenses and resulting in the humiliation and sexual abuse of male Muslim prisoners by both male and female American military personnel, the Second Gulf War was unprecedented in potential to ignite the “clash of civilizations” proposed by Huntington.

Our test of Huntington’s hypothesis leverages data provided by a unique declassified open source intelligence resource, the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). For over 70 years FBIS has monitored the world’s press, translating broadcast, print, and internet news content into English from vernacular coverage from almost every country in the world. Yet, to our knowledge, no previous academic study has leveraged FBIS’s extensive intercepts of worldwide news coverage to systematically compare the content of news coverage across countries, languages, media, and cultures. Our paper uses FBIS data to trace cross-national patterns of ingroup discourse about the Iraq invasion.

The main research questions taken up by this paper address the social dynamics of group conflict cues over time and space:
During periods of international conflict, does ingroup discourse about the conflict increase among belligerents only, or does it also increase among bystander countries?

Is ingroup discourse more prevalent in the immediate area where the conflict is taking place—that is, among countries that are geographically proximate to the conflict—than in areas that are remote from the site of the conflict?

What are the dynamics of ingroup discourse over the course of a conflict? Is the intensity of ingroup discourse relatively stable over time, or does it change in response to key events or decision phases?

Is ingroup discourse about a major international conflict structured more at the level of cultures or at the level of nations?

Examining news discourse by country, region, and language of origin, we find that the dynamics of in-group references in news discourse about Iraq are largely inconsistent with Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis. Ingroup discourse increased during the conflict among both belligerents and bystanders, but appeared to be structured more at the level of nations rather than cultures. There was no uniform ingroup dynamic among Western countries captured in FBIS data. Furthermore, ingroup discourse levels appeared to be muted in the Islamic countries in the vicinity of Iraq that in Huntington’s view ought to have been most virulently opposed to the Western invasion of their Islamic neighbor. The apparently muted reaction of Islamic nation-states to the American-led invasion of Iraq was partly an artifact of FBIS data collection methods, but largely appears to have resulted from strict government control of ingroup discourse among the very countries that should have been most inflamed by the conflict.

**FBIS: An Open-Source Window to the World’s News**

Exploring the global news discourse and accurately measuring the reaction of the local press in countries across the world requires a data source that monitors print, Internet, and broadcast outlets
worldwide on a daily basis in their vernacular languages and offers that coverage in a single compilation in a uniform language. Traditional news aggregators like LexisNexis do not include substantial foreign content and aggregate only print sources. Global news databases like NewsBank’s Access World News focus primarily on English “international” editions of foreign newspapers, which may not accurately reflect those countries’ domestic-focused vernacular coverage. Neither aggregator penetrates broadcast news, which forms one of the primary news distribution channels to the general public in regions like the Middle East (Howard 2010; Rugh 2004). Newswires like the Associated Press and Reuters have strong emphases on international news, but do so through the lens of Western-trained reporters framing events for a Western audience. To fully understand the domestic information environment within a country, especially the specific tone and word choices used to frame ongoing events, one must directly access its local vernacular press in print, internet, and broadcast forms.

Recognizing the need for such a data source that could provide on-the-ground insight into the local reaction of countries around the world on an ongoing basis, the United States and Great Britain created the CIA Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS – now the Open Source Center) and the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) global media monitoring services in the leadup to World War II. While both services jointly monitor the world’s press, FBIS offers nearly twice the annual volume of material as SWB and so is the focus of this study. From its founding, FBIS was tasked with capturing the reaction of local media, including how media coverage “varied between countries, as well as from one show to another within the same country… the way in which specific incidents were reported … [and] attitudes toward various countries.”3 Known today as “America’s

window on the world,” FBIS monitors the “full text and summaries of newspaper articles, conference proceedings, television and radio broadcasts, periodicals, and non-classified technical reports” in their native languages in over 130 countries. Indeed, FBIS forms one of the most critical foreign intelligence resources of the United States, translating more than 30 million words a month and accounted for more than 80% of actionable intelligence about the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Studeman 1992). FBIS’ global news monitoring is now so critical to the intelligence community that a 2001 Washington Post article noted “so much of what the CIA learns is collected from newspaper clippings that the director of the agency ought to be called the Pastemaster General.”

While born within the intelligence community, FBIS content became available to the public in 1974 through the Commerce Department’s National Technical Information Service (NTIS). Today, academic users can access its content through two mechanisms: the Dialog World News Connection (http://wnc.dialog.com/) and a CD compilation distributed to Federal Depository Libraries from 1996 to 2004. This paper relies on the CD compilation due to its enhanced search and filtering capability and its electronic compatibility with several statistical tools. No copy of CD #39 (May/June 2002) was able to be located, despite extensive searching of libraries across the United States, and that time period has been dropped from this analysis.

Given its roots and housing through present day as an intelligence service, an immediate question becomes whether FBIS operates as a purely tactical resource, monitoring only those

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countries of active US interest at the moment, or as a strategic resource, monitoring all countries evenly over time. An examination of the entirety of the public FBIS content 1993-2004 shows little significant geographic overemphasis, suggesting it monitors relatively evenly across countries, rather than continually changing focus based on US military priorities (Leetaru 2010). The United States, Russia, and China do have elevated percentages of content mentioning them, but given the outsized role these three countries play in the global sphere, it is unclear whether this represents a slight overemphasis by FBIS, or whether it simply reflects a greater focus on those countries in the world’s press.

To reduce translation expenses, FBIS monitoring staff prioritize the collection of English-language content where available, accounting for 46% of FBIS’s material, followed by Russian at 8% and Arabic at 6%(Leetaru 2010). The remaining 54% of monitored coverage is translated into English through a unique iterative translation process that places substantial emphasis on preserving the minute nuances of the source language, in keeping with the service’s legacy of examining the subtleties of local press reaction (Leetaru 2010). This focus on high-fidelity translation is critical to FBIS’ use for international comparative content analysis, as it ensures that the English edition represents as closely as possible the spirit and tone of the original text. Emphasis is also placed on obtaining a wide diversity of viewpoints and so no single news outlet dominates monitored coverage. More than 32,000 unique sources are listed, though the actual number of sources is likely much lower, since editors draw a distinction between the different editions of a given source (Leetaru 2010).

**Identifying FBIS News Stories about Iraq**

To explore FBIS coverage of period before, during and after the 2003 Iraq invasion, a mechanism was needed to extract only those reports discussing the invasion during the time period of interest. It was expected that nearly every report about the war would mention the word *Iraq*
somewhere in the text, so a simple keyword query was tested as a preliminary filter. Of the 177,882 matching reports, manual inspection revealed that many unfortunately contained only peripheral references to the war, or referred to the country in other contexts. Several methods of filtering the data were experimented with in an effort to restrict the results to only those reports focusing on the war itself. One approach involved computing the density of the word *Iraq* in the document text, but most documents mention it only sparingly in their text. Requiring two or more mentions of the word *Iraq* to appear in a document resulted in more than 96,000 reports being excluded, which a manual review showed many of which were in fact relevant.

Given these limitations of keyword-search criteria, we relied upon FBIS’s own subject tags to determine which stories should be considered relevant to the situation with Iraq. All FBIS reports undergo an editorial process where trained subject experts assign a series of metadata keywords to each document reflecting its primary focus. One set of keywords denote the list of countries that are the primary focus of the report’s contents. A report with only a passing reference to Iraq would have a very low likelihood of being tagged with the Iraq keyword, while a report that discusses the invasion, but does not use the word *Iraq* would still be assigned the Iraq keyword. The ability to exclude articles that refer to Iraq in passing and catch those that do not mention it by name offers unparalleled ability to filter results by geographic emphasis. A total of 123,629 news reports were tagged by FBIS with the geographic keyword *Iraq*, amounting to 11.7% of the 1,059,003 total stories captured by FBIS between July 2002 and June 2004.  

Iraq was a major topic in the worldwide news discourse captured by FBIS during this period, but by no means was it anything like the main topic.

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9 A total of 57,093 reports selected using the original keyword query were discarded. This included a Chinese technical report on sensor networks mentioning the success of a particular technology in intercepting missiles in the first Gulf War in Iraq. Since the reference was only in passing, the FBIS editor did not assign it the Iraq country tag. Another discarded report mentioned the word *Iraq* five times in a 357 word newspaper article, immediately suggesting a strong focus on Iraq. However, the actual focus of the article was on the India-Pakistan conflict, with the Iraq war used only to draw parallels between it and the Kashmir conflict.
The distribution of Iraq and non-Iraq stories by medium of origin during the analysis period was very similar. Roughly 50% of Iraq stories came from broadcast outlets compared with 51% of stories about all other topics. The only major difference was that 25% of Iraq stories were sourced from print outlets and 24% from Internet editions, while 18% of non-Iraq stories were print-based and 30% from the Internet. The high density of broadcast coverage is reflective of the 24/7 nature of radio and television content, compared with the daily cycle of most print outlets. The high density of broadcast coverage also makes FBIS almost perfectly suited to the analysis of discourse that reaches the largest domestic audiences.

Despite its global reach, FBIS captures only a small sample of the total worldwide daily media output. This raises the question of how representative FBIS data is of the press systems it monitors. We know that FBIS is not a random sample of worldwide news content: every story appearing in FBIS was chosen for its potential value to the American and British intelligence communities. However, non-random doesn’t necessarily mean unrepresentative. Although FBIS systematically excludes stories about sports and weather, it could still provide a representative mix of domestically-produced stories about the national and international affairs of interest to the intelligence services collecting these data.

While an in-depth content analysis comparing FBIS stories with the known population of stories from news sources represented in FBIS was beyond the scope of this study, its total volume of coverage by week was compared with two major papers to offer a coarse indicator of fidelity. For

At the same time, 2,840 reports not containing the word Iraq were added, such as a Paris radio broadcast on a meeting of then-President Chirac with the UN chief arms inspector Hans Blix. The broadcast itself makes no mention of the word Iraq, but the editor took into account the fact that Hans Blix was at the time assigned to the issue of Iraqi weapons. A report covering the Turkish vote to allow US forces to use its airspace for the invasion similarly contained no mention of the word Iraq, together with a CNN TURK broadcast the following day that referred only to the war and Operation Northern Slope. A Hungarian radio broadcast lamented the recent preemptive war, while other reports referred to cities within the country, such as a missile strike in Baghdad, or a letter to the Belarusian president regarding Saddam’s downfall.

A random sample of 100 of the reports that contained the word Iraq but were not given the Iraq geographic tag did not turn up any that were majority-focused on the war.
the purposes of this comparison, the *New York Times* (paper of record for the United States) and *The Times of London* (paper of record for the United Kingdom) were selected for their strong international coverage. Both papers have strong central editorial controls and are more likely to include the word “Iraq” in coverage of the invasion. The Nexis database was used to represent the population of stories from both outlets, and 89 weeks of story counts were collected covering the period immediately before, during, and after the Iraq invasion. We found that the weekly numbers of stories containing the word “Iraq” in the two outlets were strongly correlated with one another ($r = .92, p < .01$). The weekly number of FBIS stories containing the Iraq geographic tag was nearly as highly correlated with the *New York Times* count ($r = .76, p < .01$) and the *Times of London* count ($r = .80, p < .01$). From the standpoint of weekly attention given to Iraq over the course of the invasion, the sample of global news discourse captured by FBIS closely tracks the full contents of the papers of record of two major countries, offering strong evidence of the fidelity of its sample. This further underscores FBIS’s role for the intelligence community as a strategic monitoring service rather than a tactical searchlight, and increases our confidence that the FBIS data provide a broadly representative picture of news coverage about Iraq that appeared in the monitored countries.

**The Relative Intensity of Ingroup Discourse**

The central dependent variable in our analysis of cross-national discourse is a measure we call the *Relative Intensity of Ingroup Discourse* (RIID). Although studies of social identity processes reveal the importance of discourse about both ingroups and outgroups, enumerating the vast range number of specific group referents that might structure conflict discourse cross-nationally presents an overwhelmingly complex task. Our solution is to focus instead on ingroup discourse only by tracking the appearance of first-person plural pronouns in FBIS news coverage: the personal pronouns “we”
and “us,” the possessive pronouns “our” and “ours,” and the reflexive pronoun “ourselves.”

Because such pronouns always refer to persons, we can be sure that such mentions always refer to ingroups of one sort or another. In contrast, second-person plural pronoun forms like “they,” “them,” “those” and “their” are commonly used to refer to objects (“I like those apples”) and events (“basketball games may be fun to watch, but they are more fun to play”). Because of this tendency, only ingroup discourse can be tracked with pronoun usage. Fortunately, these ingroup pronouns carry a consistent meaning across all languages and cultures, so they are almost ideally suited for analysis of ingroup discourse patterns.

Our analysis of ingroup discourse patterns within and across countries begins with a simple count of the total number of first person plural pronouns per 100 words of news discourse. This ingroup reference rate is calculated separately for every one of the more than 1 million stories in the FBIS dataset for this period, and average rates of ingroup references can be straightforwardly calculated by aggregating stories up to the level of countries, languages, or particular types of news media. Yet as a measure of the relative frequency of ingroup discourse, the rate of references to the first-person plural per 100 words is complicated by at least three challenges.

First, use of the first-person plural within news discourse can denote many things, of which only some refer to national, regional, or cultural ingroups. A simple count of such mentions makes no distinction between patriotic appeals and non-patriotic references like “our team won the national playoffs,” “we want more lemonade,” and “can someone find us some cigarettes.” The number of first person plurals used in reference to social ingroups is therefore a subset of such references, but the size of the relevant and irrelevant subsets is unknown and cannot be easily determined using data mining techniques. The consequence of this first challenge is that the number of references to the

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10 Every appearance of these five types of first person plural pronouns was counted whether it was capitalized or not. However, the appearance of “US” with both letters capitalized was excluded from our count of ingroup references, as many news systems use US (without periods) as an acronym for the United States of America.
first person plural within news discourse at any given point in time lacks a definite meaning. Yet if the “irrelevant” uses of first person plurals are randomly distributed in news discourse, and if they appear at a fairly constant rate within any given topical domain, then any change in the rate with which such references are made should be a meaningful indicator of change in the degree that the topic is being associated with an ingroup of some sort. When news discourse about a particular person, topic, or event is marked by a sudden increase in the rate of ingroup references, it is reasonable to assume that ingroup cues are signaling the importance of that subject to large social groups in the news audience. The meaning of first person plurals as indicators of ingroup discourse must therefore be drawn from studying the dynamics of such references.

A second complication is that there is no reason to expect the terms “us,” “we,” and “our” to refer to domestic ingroups within the country or region from which a news story originates. For example, consider the opening lines of President Bush’s May 1, 2003 speech from the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln in which he declared the invasion to have been completed:

> Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the Battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed. And now our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country. In this battle, we have fought for the cause of liberty, and for the peace of the world. Our nation and our coalition are proud of this accomplishment — yet it is you, the members of the United States military, who achieved it.\(^{11}\)

With five references to “we” and “our” out of 74 words, this opening section of President Bush’s speech is rich in ingroup discourse. Yet if this quote were carried on al-Jazeera, such references would hardly cue collective identities among Arab viewers, except perhaps in reaction to the multiple ingroup references about American national identity.

\(^{11}\) The text of President Bush’s speech was obtained from http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/05/01/iraq/main551946.shtml
A third complication is that ingroup references in FBIS data vary systematically as a function of the original language that the news content was translated from. Within the complete set of all captured news discourse between July 2, 2002 and June 28, 2004, the rate with which first person plurals appear in news discourses runs from 1.37 per 100 words in Creole \( (n=698) \), to .80 in Bulgarian \( (n=5,827) \), .68 in Albanian \( (n=9,993) \), .56 in Arabic \( (n=55,167) \), .42 in Mandarin \( (n=22,930) \), .23 in Vietnamese \( (n=1,381) \), and .11 in Bengali \( (n=808) \). Compared to the average of .26 ingroup references per 100 words in English \( (n=548,096) \), it is clear that the rate of ingroup references is anything but constant across languages. This variation likely arises from a combination of language structure, cultural norms, the geographic distribution of ingroup-outgroup conflicts occurring at the time these data were collected, and the selection criteria used by FBIS to choose stories for translation from different countries and regions of the world.

These reasons why the rates of ingroup references across languages are so different in these data must be somehow taken into account when comparing ingroup discourse rates across countries, languages and cultures. One solution is to estimate a baseline rate at which first person plurals are mentioned in public affairs news from a given country, language, or culture. Since there are no obvious standards of such usage by language, country, or culture from which to draw a baseline rate—to our knowledge, news discourse from around the world has never before been analyzed in this way—we settle for the best approximation that is available to us: comparing the rate of ingroup references per 100 words of discourse about a topic of interest to the rate of ingroup references per 100 words in all other topics combined. This *Relative Intensity of Ingroup Discourse* (RIID) takes positive values when ingroup references are more common in discourse about the topic of interest than in discourse about all other topics combined, and negative values when references to “we”, “our,” and “us” are less frequent in discourse about the topic of interest relative to discourse about all other topics.
The main dependent variable in the analyses that follow is therefore the RIID in discourse about Iraq relative to discourse about all other topics. Since only 11.7% (n=123,629) of all FBIS stories appearing during the period of interest (July 2, 2002 through June 28, 2004) were categorized as being relevant to the topic of Iraq, the baseline rate of ingroup discourse considers most of the news stories within the FBIS dataset. This baseline rate should therefore yield a robust yardstick for determining the relative amount of ingroup discourse about Iraq compared to other topics. This relative intensity of ingroup discourse measure can be aggregated up from the story level to any desired unit of comparison (e.g., countries, regions, languages). Positive values indicate that ingroup signals are more common in Iraq discourse than in other topics appearing in news coverage from a given unit of comparison, while negative values indicate that ingroup references are more common in other topics than in news coverage about Iraq.

Findings

To provide consistent points of comparison across time in the analyses that follow, we note the dates of six important events in the periods leading up to and immediately following the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Table 1). Our analysis of FBIS data begins on July 2, 2002, two months before the September 2, 2002 Labor Day weekend that marks the “soft start” of the Bush administration’s campaign to justify military action against Iraq (Isikoff and Corn 2006: 33). The formal announcement of the administration’s willingness to use force against Iraq came in President Bush’s

12 We calculate this measure somewhat differently when the country of Iraq is the unit of comparison, because only 16 stories out of 6,573 from Iraq were coded as dealing with topics unrelated to Iraq. This leaves us with an insufficient pool of Iraqi news stories about other topics for use as a baseline rate in the relative intensity measure. In order to get around this difficulty, when the unit of comparison is the country of Iraq (and only in this singular case) we calculate the baseline rate as the average rate of ingroup references for all Arabic-language news stories about topics other than Iraq. In practice, this change makes no substantive difference to the conclusions drawn from these data. The weekly measure of relative intensity for the country of Iraq used to produce the loess trend in Figure 1 is almost perfectly correlated with the raw rate of ingroup language in Iraqi news coverage about Iraq (r = .92, p < .001). This is because the baseline rate in Arabic-language news is so stable over time. The main value in subtracting the Arabic-language baserate from rate of ingroup references within Iraqi news about Iraq is that this transformation allows the Iraq results to be compared directly against the other relative intensity measures using the same numerical scale.
speech to the United Nations General Assembly on September 12, 2002 (Event 1). A month later, on October 16, 2002, the U.S. Congress voted to authorize the use of military force against Iraq (Event 2). The governments of the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland soon joined the United States in committing military forces to the Iraq invasion, and on March 19, 2003 the military action against Iraq commenced (Event 3). The invasion phase of military involvement in Iraq ended on May 1, 2003, when President Bush announced an end to major combat operations from the deck of the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln (Event 4). Iraqi president Saddam Hussein remained a fugitive until December 13, 2003, when he was captured by American special operations forces outside Tikrit (Event 5). Finally, news that American forces were alleged to have abused Iraqi prisoners began was mentioned in a one-paragraph news release by the U.S. Central Command on January 16, 2004. Five days later CNN announced that the Abu Ghraib prison facility was being investigated by military authorities, after reports that male and female soldiers posed in photos with unclothed Iraqi prisoners (Ricchiardi 2004). The pictures were held in secret by military authorities until April 28, 2004, when they were first shown on the CBS program “60 Minutes II” (Event 6). Our analysis of FBIS data ends on June 30, two months after the Abu Ghraib photos were released. As an aid to interpreting the dynamics of ingroup discourse, these six events are labeled numerically in all of the time series graphs that follow.

**The Dynamics of Ingroup Discourse among Belligerents and Bystanders**

An initial test of the validity of our dependent variable as a measure of ingroup cueing is provided by examining RIID levels for both belligerents and bystanders over time. For both belligerents and bystanders, the rate of ingroup mentions within Iraq discourse is consistently higher than the rate of ingroup mentions across all other topics combined, which indicates that ingroup signals within these sets of countries were consistently emphasizing the Iraq conflict over other
possible topics. Figure 1 shows the values of a locally-weighted least-squares regression (lowess) on weekly measures of RIID for Iraq discourse. Within this and all other graphs of this type that follow, lowess regressions are run on 104 weekly data points using a bandwidth of .1, which means that each point in the smoothed line represents a locally weighted regression derived from approximately 10 data points clustered around each estimated weekly value. The Y-axis displays the relative intensity of ingroup references in Iraq discourse relative to all other topics, with the zero line indicating parity in number of ingroup mentions per 100 words of news discourse between Iraq stories and all other stories. Positive RIID values indicate that Iraq stories have more frequent ingroup mentions. For example, a score of .2 indicates that Iraq discourse for a given week contains an average of .2 additional ingroup references per 100 words relative to the average rate of ingroup mentions in all other topics for that week. Negative RIID values indicate that ingroup cues are more prevalent in other topics appearing in the news than in discourse about Iraq.

The top graph in Figure 1 shows RIID dynamics among the countries that committed military forces to support the invasion of Iraq. The thick line shows the relative intensity of ingroup discourse about Iraq among the three countries represented in FBIS data that committed military forces during the invasion itself: the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland. The fourth country to commit invasion forces, the United States, is not represented in FBIS data and is therefore omitted from this trendline. The thin line in the top graph shows RIID dynamics among the 21 countries that committed at least 150 military personnel to support Iraq operations after the invasion phase was completed. Among the countries intervening with military forces, RIID levels increased quickly.

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13 T-tests for average rate of ingroup mentions in Iraq and in all other discourse are highly significant in all of the trends shown in Figures 1 and 2, save for the country of Iraq, which had too few non-Iraq stories to analyze in this way.
14 According to Global Security (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition.htm) and published news accounts from the immediate post-invasion period (sourced and summarized in...
around the time of President Bush’s speech to the United Nations (Event 1), indicating that ingroup cues became more prominent within Iraq discourse than within other topics appearing in the news. After the congressional vote to authorize military force against Iraq (Event 2), RIID levels dropped rapidly among countries contributing invasion forces, but rose even higher among countries who would contribute forces only after the invasion was over. As the invasion date drew nearer (Event 3), RIID levels rose again among invasion countries even as it gradually declined among countries providing military support after the invasion. The end of the invasion phase (Event 4) produces a peak in RIID levels among invading countries, followed by a rapid dropoff that stabilizes at slightly above the ingroup discourse rate for all other topics appearing in news coverage from those countries. In contrast, among countries contributing military forces after the invasion, the invasion period itself marks a continuing decline in RIID levels that reaches its nadir as the invasion comes to a close. Around August of 2003, RIID rates in these countries return to a level nearly as high as during pre-invasion phase. The period of Saddam Hussein’s capture (Event 5) is met with a temporary decline in ingroup discourse for both trends in the top graph of Figure 1. Finally, as the discussion of Abu Ghraib prisoner abuses picks up in February, March, and April of 2004, RIID levels pick up again among the countries who committed military forces after the invasion even as it held fairly level among the countries who invaded Iraq. After the photos were released (Event 6) levels of RIID for both groups surges once again before declining rapidly toward parity with non-Iraq topics.

The lower graph in Figure 1 shows the RIID dynamics within Iraq (thick line) and among 23 countries geographically proximate to Iraq (thin line). The list of neighboring countries represents North African and Middle Eastern countries (including Israel) plus Turkey, Afghanistan, and

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multi-National_Force_%E2%80%93_Iraq, the countries committing at least 150 military personnel in support of post-invasion Iraq operations were Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mongolia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Romania, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, and Ukraine.
In these countries, RIID dynamics follow a different pattern than for the countries committing military forces to support the invasion. Two trends are especially striking. The first is clear temporal pattern of RIID dynamics within Iraq itself. Before the invasion begins, the relative intensity of ingroup discourse is nearly identical between Iraq and its geographically proximate neighbors. Of particular note, there is no sudden surge in Iraqi RIID associated with the American signals of impending invasion (Events 1 and 2). There are three occasions when ingroup discourse within Iraq becomes especially intense: during the period immediately before and continuing through the initial weeks of the invasion (Event 3), during the period in fall of 2003 when the insurgency begins to gain momentum, and during the period between the initial mention of the Abu Ghraib scandal and right before the torture pictures were released (Event 6). Iraqi RIID peaks during the invasion, but in the final weeks of the invasion period RIID rates decline rapidly toward parity with other topics. Curiously, the final peak of ingroup discourse within Iraq happened before rather than after the release of the Abu Ghraib photos.

The second pattern in the lower graph of Figure 1 is that although RIID values are generally positive among the countries geographically proximate to Iraq, their RIID levels tend to be lower than for the countries who invaded or who later supported the invasion with military forces. Among geographically proximate countries, RIID levels peak before Congress authorizes force against Iraq, and tend to decline gradually thereafter back toward parity with other topics. Even during the invasion (between Events 3 and 4) RIID levels remain surprisingly muted among geographically proximate countries. And in contrast to the reaction within countries supporting the invasion with

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15 To determine geographic and cultural proximity, we began with the list of 20 countries included by the World Bank’s in its Middle East and North Africa Region: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. In addition, Turkey was also included, as it was the northern invasion route into Kurdish Iraq, and was therefore debating its potential involvement with great fervor as before and during the invasion period. Afghanistan and Pakistan were also counted as geographically proximate countries given the American-led invasion that captured Afghanistan from the Taliban regime, and the close involvement of Pakistan in support of continuing U.S. military operations along the border between the two countries.
military forces, neither Iraq nor its neighbors experienced any overall surge of ingroup discourse following the release of the torture photos. These patterns suggest that the Abu Ghraib scandal was met in the Arab press with sober analysis and calm judgment. Further analysis will reveal that this was not the case, as will presently become clear.

Thus far it is clear that within belligerent countries, news coverage about Iraq was relatively more laden with ingroup discourse than was news coverage about other topics, and this ingroup discourse ebbed and flowed with the passage of key events in the conflict. Ingroup cues within countries near Iraq were also relatively concentrated into news discourse about the conflict, although the level of such discourse seems relatively more muted than one might expect given the intense pulses of ingroup discourse emanating from within Iraq itself. What about the rest of the world beyond the belligerents and Iraq’s immediate neighbors? Figure 2 shows the trend within the pooled news discourse from the remaining 143 bystander nations tracked by FBIS.

**INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE**

It is clear in this figure that ingroup discourse about the Iraq invasion spills over to countries all around the world, regardless of their level of direct involvement in the conflict. Throughout the entire two year period of interest, among bystander countries Iraq discourse averaged a higher average rate of ingroup mentions per 100 words than was found for all other topics combined. Iraq was clearly a focal point for ingroup discourse all around the world. Levels of RIID rose steadily among these bystander countries from the president’s United Nations speech (Event 1) until just before the start of the invasion (Event 3), before declining gradually as the invasion got underway until right after Saddam Hussein was captured (Event 5). Following the initial revelations of a potential American scandal at the Abu Ghraib prison, RIID among bystander countries surged and held for a period of several months.

*Group Referents Associated with First-Person Plural Pronouns*
Before delving further into our analysis of RIID dynamics, it is important to establish what kinds of groups the first-person plural pronouns used in our ingroup discourse measure are referencing. Huntington’s argument implies that in the context of an international military conflict, “we,” “us,” and “our” should tend to refer to ingroups drawn at the level of cultures or civilizations rather than to ingroups drawn at the level of nation-states.

To assess what types of ingroups tended to be used in conjunction with first-person pronouns appearing in Iraq discourse, we conducted a word-by-word analysis of the full text of the nearly 124,000 FBIS stories tagged as being relevant to Iraq (n = 81 million words). Within each of the five country types displayed in Figures 1 and 2, we analyzed the frequency of nouns appearing within one word before and after every appearance of “us,” “we,” “our,” “ours,” and “ourselves.” If an adjacent word was separated by a punctuation mark like a comma or period, it was discarded from consideration in this analysis.

Table 2 shows the top 20 nouns appearing as the object of ingroup pronouns in Iraq discourse that appeared within each of the five country types. The frequency with which each word appeared in conjunction with ingroup mentions within the country type is shown next to each noun in the list. Inspection of these most-frequent ingroup associations offers strong disconfirmation of Huntington’s thesis: by far the most common referent is to a nation-level group. The word “country” far outstrips other referents in four of the five country categories, and even in Iraq it is the third most common ingroup referent. The next most common referent is the ambiguous “people” (in the sense of “our people”), which could be taken as either a cultural or nationalistic reference. But if “people” is

16 We also examined the most frequent verbs appearing immediately before or after an ingroup pronoun. Although not shown here, this analysis reveals that among all country groups other than Iraq itself, ingroup discourse was most commonly associated with verbs addressing demands, actions, expectations, and communication. Only in the case of Iraq itself did the most common verbs come to include strongly militaristic terms, such as “violated,” “attacked,” “defend,” and “protect.” In contrast to such strong language from Iraq, its neighboring countries were more likely to associate ingroup pronouns with demands (e.g., “want,” “make,” “take,” and “give”) and with expectations for the future (e.g., “believe,” “hope,” and “expect”).
potentially ambiguous, hardly any of the other top-20 nouns in any of the five lists could be taken as reference to ingroups drawn at the level of cultures or civilizations. The words “nation”, “national,” “country,” and “government” appear with great frequency in all five lists. Within Iraq itself, “people” is the most common referent for ingroup discourse, followed by “airspace,” “country” and “nation.” The cultural referent “Arab” only shows up as number six on the list from Iraq, and while five other nouns on the list from Iraq refer to specific people groups, two are direct references to Iraqi groups (“Iraqi” and “Kurdish”), while three others are potentially cultural referents (“brothers”, “Turkoman,” and “Palestinian”). Only the Iraq group includes ethnic group references beyond “Arab.” Even within the 23 predominantly Muslim countries geographically proximate to Iraq, the word “Arab” is only seventh on the list, having only one fifth the frequency of “country,” and trailing far behind both “national” and “nation.” Military and security referents are common in the remaining three types of countries, while “allies” “countries,” “partners,” “friends” are particularly common in bystander countries not militarily involved in the invasion.

INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

In short, the ingroup referents appearing most frequently in Iraq-related discourse are mostly drawn at the level of nation-states. The terms “Muslim” and “Islam” are never mentioned in any of the top-20 lists. The word “Arab” appears on only three of the five lists, and even in the case of Iraq and its predominantly Muslim neighbors, “Arab” always trails far behind nationalistic referents in frequency of use. This set of findings offers strong disconfirmation of the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis.

The Dynamics of Ingroup Discourse among Countries with Close Cultural Ties

Although the RIID dynamics among clusters of countries follow clear patterns in Figures 1 and 2, the meaning of these patterns is difficult to interpret. A single trend or set of referents for such diverse groups is less revealing than a lower-level analysis that considers ingroup discourse dynamics.
country by country. For example, the list of countries geographically proximate to Iraq include Israel alongside 22 predominantly Muslim and mostly Arab countries, even though Israeli reactions to the Iraq invasion should be decidedly different than the response among Muslim nations. A country-by-country analysis is also important for clarifying whether RIID levels are affected by the degree of government control over domestic news media. For example, although Freedom House rates the press systems for the three invading countries as entirely free of government control, outside of Europe and North America most domestic media systems are partly or entirely controlled by government authorities (Freedom House 2011). It is possible that countries with authoritarian press systems either suppress or promote the amount of RIID discourse for political purposes. To the extent that this occurs, then our analysis of news discourse patterns from these countries may tell more about the government’s efforts to control domestic ingroup dynamics than about any “naturally-occurring” ingroup discourse flowing from person to person through the affected nations.

To shed light on these possible confounds in the analysis, the next sections presents RIID trends at the level of individual countries. We first compare weekly changes in ingroup discourse intensity among four countries sharing strong cultural ties but that made different decisions on whether to support the invasion with military force. Following that, we examine patterns of ingroup discourse intensity before, during, and after the invasion of Iraq among the 74 countries that have sufficient amounts of news coverage within FBIS to analyze broader trends in ingroup discourse.

The “clash of civilizations” hypothesis predicts that ingroup responses to outgroup threats among countries within a given civilization should follow common patterns during times of conflict. However, Huntington’s civilizations are difficult to operationalize in a convincing way (e.g., Fox 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2002), a problem that is further complicated in our analysis of ingroup discourse by the previously-mentioned differences in press freedom across the world. One way around these difficulties is to narrow down the country-level analysis to Western nations with independent media systems that are widely recognized as having strong ties of language, religions,
culture, and shared history. Only a small proportion of nations in the FBIS collection contain enough Iraq discourse for a week-by-week analysis at the level of individual countries, but among them are four countries from the Commonwealth of Nations that are especially relevant to understanding the dynamics of ingroup discourse about the Iraq invasion. The founding members of the Commonwealth of Nations (formerly the British Commonwealth) were the United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. Despite strong cultural ties among these nations, two of these countries made major commitments of military force to support the invasion, while the rest refrained from any direct military involvement in the invasion. Among these six countries, the number of FBIS stories from the United Kingdom (n = 23,652 stories), Australia (n = 8,934), South Africa (n = 9,609), and Canada (n = 5,412) had sufficient weekly volumes for dynamic analysis across the period of interest.\textsuperscript{17}

The top graph in Figure 3 shows the RIID dynamics for Australia and the United Kingdom, two countries with major military commitments to the invasion force. The Y-axis of this graph covers a broader range than for Figures 1 and 2, but the reference lines provide a point of comparison across these figures. Within the United Kingdom (thick line), RIID levels briefly intensified around the time that the U.S. Congress voted to authorize war (Event 2). As the invasion date drew nearer, British RIID levels rose higher until reaching a peak around the beginning of the invasion (Event 3). After the invasion, ingroup discourse intensity fell away to hover slightly above the level found in other topics, with notable peaks after Saddam Hussein was captured (Event 5) and after the release of the Abu Ghraib photos (Event 6).

INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE

\textsuperscript{17} Ireland (n = 2,795 stories) and New Zealand (n = 1,612 stories) had an insufficient volume of news in FBIS to permit a week-by-week analysis, but Ireland has sufficient numbers of Iraq stories to be included in the country maps presented below.
The story is quite different for the other Commonwealth country to support the invasion militarily, Australia (thin line). That country’s RIID is relatively subdued until December 2003, when Australian ingroup discourse becomes intensely focused on Iraq. After receding somewhat as the invasion draws near (Event 3), Australian ingroup references peak again shortly before the invasion is over (Event 4). After the invasion phase is completed, RIID takes negative values, indicating that ingroup signals within Australia have switched to topics other than Iraq. For Australian news coverage, ingroup discourse about Iraq was focused on key decision points prior to the invasion’s end. With the invasion completed, ingroup language in Australian news discourse shifted to other topics and never returned to pre-invasion levels.\(^{18}\)

In contrast to the ingroup references among Commonwealth countries with troop commitments, the lower graph in Figure 3 shows that RIID dynamics carried a different tempo in Canada and South Africa. Although both Canada and South Africa chose to withhold military support for the invasion, their RIID dynamics occurred roughly in parallel, with peaks shortly after Congress authorized military force (Event 3), right before the start of the invasion (Event 4), in the fall of 2003, and right around the time that the Abu Ghraib photos were released (Event 6). Furthermore, the peak levels of RIID were much higher for noncombatant South Africa than for the other three Commonwealth countries, including the two that committed troops to the invasion. Intense periods of ingroup discourse about Iraq are clearly not limited to belligerent nations. Furthermore, the periods of peak intensity occurred at different times in each of the four countries. We suspect that these peaks corresponded to vigorous national debates about the merits of invading and occupying Iraq.

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\(^{18}\) The relatively flatter trend in the United Kingdom is probably an artifact of composition. Most of the FBIS news coverage from the UK comes from Reuters and BBC, which are internationally distributed and which therefore should be less likely to convey intense streams of domestically-directed ingroup discourse. We suspect that if we were able to separate BBC and Reuters from domestically-directed British news outlets, the comparison would probably reveal a much higher intensity of ingroup discourse about Iraq.
However, we have not yet examined the news discourse in sufficient detail to permit an assessment of why these peaks were occurring at the times they were.

The ingroup discourse trends across these four Commonwealth countries suggest no common dynamic of the sort proposed by Huntington’s thesis. Instead, RIID levels appeared to be structured by forces operating at the level of individual nations rather than of entire cultures.

*The Geography of Ingroup Discourse around the World*

Further insight to the question of whether ingroup discourse is structured at the level of nation-states or civilizations can be gained by examining all 74 nations for which country-level RIID dynamics can be compared before, during, and after the invasion. Data limitations in country-level FBIS holdings require aggregating ingroup discourse across a small number of broad periods. The “Buildup Phase” is considered as running from the beginning of September 2002 until March 18, 2003, which is the day before the invasion took place. The “Invasion Phase” runs from March 19 to May 1, 2003 (the period bounded by events 3 and 4 in the previous figures). The “Post-Invasion Phase” runs from May 2, 2003 through the end of June, 2004. Figures 4, 5 and 6 show whether each country’s rate of ingroup mentions in Iraq news was higher, on par with, or lower than rates of ingroup mentions within all other news topics combined. To provide consistent reference points with previous figures, “higher” indicates RIID values of .2 or greater for Iraq discourse, “lower” indicates RIID values of -.2 or lower, and the “on par” category captures RIID values of between -.2 and .2. Countries lacking sufficient numbers of Iraq stories to permit an assessment of relative intensity are shown without shading.¹⁹

¹⁹ Countries with 100 or fewer stories about Iraq when summing across all three time periods were omitted from this analysis. The patterns shown in Figures 4, 5, and 6 also hold when more fine-grained categories are used in place of the three-part category scheme shown here: there are no obvious threshold artifacts from the cutpoints we chose for this analysis.
Comparing the country-level intensity of ingroup discourse about Iraq during the buildup, invasion, and post-invasion periods confirms that levels of ingroup discourse were not spatially correlated with a country’s proximity to Iraq. During the Buildup Phase (Figure 4), the most extreme levels of ingroup discourse about Iraq tended to be found in countries far from the Middle East. Although the figure’s scale makes it difficult to detect, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates all had relatively higher levels of ingroup discourse about Iraq before the invasion. Since a large proportion of news coverage captured within Qatar was from the transnational al-Jazeera network, this small country deserves special attention within our analysis. Beyond those three, the only other geographically proximate countries with elevated levels of RIID during this period were Algeria and Afghanistan. Higher levels of ingroup discourse were also found in Mexico, Argentina, Kazakhstan, the Balkans, the Iberian peninsula, and Eastern Europe, particularly Poland and Belarus. On the Pacific Rim, elevated ingroup discourse about Iraq is seen in Vietnam, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines, while North Korea displays relatively low levels of RIID about Iraq.

It is only during the invasion phase that countries in the immediate proximity of Iraq show consistently higher levels of ingroup mentions in their news discourse about Iraq. Figure 5 shows that while Kuwaiti RIID levels dropped to parity with other topics, the invasion period prompted the countries of Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and Azerbaijan to join Algeria with higher relative rates of ingroup discourse about Iraq. In contrast, despite the presence of Western military forces in a sovereign Islamic country, RIID levels remained muted in the nearby countries of Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. The same pattern of parity in first person plural mentions holds for most other predominantly Muslim countries, including Sudan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. Israeli RIID levels also remained roughly on par with other topics during the invasion phase. In contrast, the most distinctive geographical concentration of high-intensity RIID levels is
found in Southern Europe and Eastern Europe, with elevated levels of ingroup references also seen in Iraq discourse from Ireland, Norway, and Portugal.\textsuperscript{20} Aside from the four Asian countries that already had high levels during the buildup phase, no other Asian countries had especially elevated levels of “we,” “us,” and “our” mentions in Iraq news during the invasion period.

In the year following the invasion, Figure 6 shows that RIID levels in Iraq discourse declined further for most countries, so that Iraq news was little different from other news topics in rates of mentioning first person plurals. The primary exceptions are the areas of elevated ingroup discourse in Iraq, Europe, the North African countries of Libya and Algeria, and Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. During the post-invasion period, Afghanistan’s RIID levels within Iraq discourse turned negative, indicating that other topics came to occupied ingroup attention in that country’s news. And even though the country of Qatar had higher levels of Iraq-related RIID for the buildup and invasion phases, it had lower levels of RIID during the post-invasion phase. This suggests that the relatively less-controlled satellite broadcasts of al-Jazeera also appear to have shifted ingroup discourse away from Iraq and toward other topics after the invasion was completed.

In short, the patterns in Figures 4, 5 and 6 show that there is little consistent spatial or cultural focus to levels of ingroup discourse about Iraq. No clash of civilizations between Islam and the West is visible in ingroup discourse about Iraq among the 74 countries amenable to content analysis.

\textit{Where Was the Outrage in the Middle East?}

The findings thus far suggest that RIID levels in news coverage from countries neighboring Iraq tended to remain relatively unperturbed throughout most of the period under consideration. However, the data presented thus far included all news content from each country or group without regard to language or medium. Since the audiences for print and Internet media in Middle Eastern countries

\textsuperscript{20} Portugal also had high RIID levels during the buildup phase.
remain relatively smaller than for broadcast outlets (Howard 2010), the “news that matters” (Iyengar and Kinder 1987) for popular opinion in Arab countries comes more from radio and television broadcasts than print or Internet sources (Cherribi 2006; Nisbet et al. 2004; Rugh 2004). However, because broadcast news is more expensive for FBIS to translate, its tendency to rely on print and Internet sources could affect our ability to detect ingroup discourse reaching Middle Eastern audiences through the most popular channels. We might also wonder whether the preponderance of English-language news sources representing the Arab world in FBIS data carries a different ingroup conversation than that publicized through Arabic-language news sources. FBIS prefers to capture news content in English whenever possible, to limit the need for translators and thereby increase the overall volume of information that can be analyzed. But English-language news produced within the Middle East is aimed at South Asians and other English-speaking foreigners who are working in the region but do not speak Arabic (Rugh 2004). This suggests that the intensity of ingroup discourse engaging domestic, Arabic-language audiences might differ from English-language news directed at expatriates and other outsiders.

A first look at these possibilities is provided in Figure 7, which shows average RIID rates in by original language and news medium in Iraq-related news discourse disseminated within Iraq, Israel, and all other neighboring countries. Only languages captured at high volumes are considered here, which limits our analysis of regional languages to Arabic, English, Hebrew, and Persian. Among the three news media categories from which news discourse was obtained by FBIS, the distinction between broadcast on the one hand and print and Internet on the other is much clearer than between print and Internet. Figure 7 shows that RIID rates tend to be higher in broadcast stories than in print

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21 To get a clearer sense of the boundaries for FBIS’s source typology, we examined the names of the news sources from which FBIS stories were drawn for two sample months of data. We found that FBIS’s broadcasting category contains both radio and television transcripts, while the print category includes both magazines and newspapers, and a sizeable part of the Internet category appears to consist of online content from print media. This
or Internet stories, particularly when the news originates in Israel and in other countries neighboring
Iraq. In contrast, RIID rates bear no consistent relationship to media of origin for stories originating
within Iraq itself.\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE}

The patterns by language are particularly striking. Within the country of Iraq, Arabic-language
news in print and broadcast sources tended to have relatively high rates of ingroup cues. Among
Internet sources, rates of ingroup cues in Arabic-language news were about the same as those in non-Iraq stories.\textsuperscript{23}

According to Freedom House, Israel is the only country in the Middle East with a press system
that is free of government control (Freedom House 2011). Within the country of Israel, RIID levels
were high in broadcast news stories about Iraq, but relatively on par with the rate of ingroup
references among all other topics in print and Internet outlets. RIID levels within English-language
Israeli broadcasts about Iraq were nearly twice as high as in any other combination of language and
medium among the three country groups in Figure 7. Israeli broadcasts in Arabic and Hebrew had
roughly similar RIID levels, but both types of broadcasts had RIID levels orders of magnitude higher
than for news in the same languages from Israeli print or Internet outlets. Surprisingly, RIID levels in
Arabic-language news about Iraq was higher in broadcasts originating in Israel than in broadcasts
originating either in Iraq or in the other geographically proximate countries. Since news media in
every other country in the region are controlled at least partly by government authorities (Freedom

\textsuperscript{22} As with the analysis in Figure 1, the relative intensity measure for Iraq news uses the average rates of
ingroup mentions in Arabic-language news from geographically proximate countries due to insufficient numbers of
stories about topics other than Iraq.

\textsuperscript{23} Although not shown in Figure 7, a significant amount of Kurdish-language news from Iraq was also
captured by FBIS. Because all of this Kurdish-language news was about Iraq, there is no way to calculate a relative
intensity measure that could be compared to the others shown in Figure 7. However, the raw levels of ingroup
mentions within Kurdish-language news are revealing. In broadcast outlets, Kurdish-language news has a relatively
low rate of .35 ingroup mentions per 100 words, whereas print outlets have a rate of .57 per 100 words and Internet
outlets have a rate of .59 per 100 words in Kurdish-language news.
House 2011; Rugh 2004), this pattern raises the possibility that Middle Eastern countries lacking press freedom were intentionally suppressing ingroup discourse in news about Iraq.

The third chart in Figure 7 shows that ingroup mentions among all other geographically proximate countries were hardly more prevalent in news coverage about Iraq than about all other topics, regardless of language or medium. Furthermore, RIID levels were typically lower in news originating in other geographically proximate countries than in news originating in either Iraq or Israel. This pattern is particularly extreme in news from Iran, which was the only source of Persian-language news captured by FBIS in the entire region. Persian-language news about Iraq had consistently negative RIID levels, indicating that ingroup cues were less common in Persian-language news coverage about Iraq than in Persian-language news about all other topics. It is difficult to tell whether this pattern reflects the long history of military conflict between Iran and Iraq, or an effort by the Iranian government to dampen popular responses to the Western-led invasion of its neighbor to the west. Either way, this finding lends credence to the possibility that Middle Eastern governments were suppressing the appearance of ingroup cues in news about the Iraq situation.

A clear test of this possibility requires looking at the over-time dynamics of ingroup cues within geographically proximate countries. Given the differences in relative intensity of ingroup discourse within Iraq and Israel compared to other geographically proximate countries (Figure 7), such an analysis requires excluding Iraq and Israel to focus on the remaining set of neighboring countries, which includes all other countries from the Middle East and North Africa, as well as Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

Figure 8 reveals that while RIID levels in English-language news originating within these geographically proximate countries were slightly positive throughout the period under consideration, Arabic-language news discourse about Iraq followed a very different pattern. In Arabic-language news, RIID levels peaked suddenly in early December 2003 and remained elevated until midway
through the invasion period (between Events 3 and 4). At that point, Arabic-language ingroup references within coverage about Iraq plummeted to parity by the end of the invasion and continued into negative values during the immediate post-invasion period. Arabic-language RIID levels remained stable around the parity level until the beginning of April 2004, when ingroup discourse suddenly surged again in conjunction with the growing scandal surrounding the Abu Ghraib prison. Figure 8 reveals that the Abu Ghraib surge in ingroup references happens in Arabic, but not in English. Once the photos were released, Arabic-language RIID levels once again take a dip before trending upward at the end of the series. In contrast, English-language RIID levels remained near the parity level from the fall of 2003 until the end of June 2004.

This pattern explains the apparent placidity of Middle Eastern ingroup discourse about Iraq that was noted in Figure 1. Of the 167,152 news stories captured by FBIS for these countries during the period of interest, 41% originally appeared in English, compared to only 17% in Arabic.24 Since a plurality of FBIS stories from Iraq’s geographically proximate neighbors was originally published in English, and since English-language news emanating from the Middle East tended to have lower levels of ingroup discourse intensity about Iraq, the aggregate trends in Figure 1 mask the true nature of Arabic ingroup response to the invasion and the Abu Ghraib scandal. The striking trend in Figure 8 is how suddenly the intensity of Arabic-language ingroup discourse about Iraq rose and fell. Aside from the immediate post-invasion period and the period around the time that the Abu Ghraib photos were released, relative rates of ingroup mentions in Arabic were show no clear or sustained collective signal that group interests were at stake.

For several months following the invasion, English-language news from these countries was more likely to signal ingroup interest about Iraq than was Arabic-language news. Once again, this

24 Other major languages represented in this subset of stories included Persian (15% of stories) Turkish (8%), Dari (7%), and Urdu (5%).
would seem to be best explained by the lack of media independence within the authoritarian countries that controlled most of the regional discourse picked up by FBIS. Relative to the rest of the world (see Figures 1 and 2), relative ingroup discourse about Iraq tended to be much more subdued among Iraq’s neighbors than in the rest of the world. The positive surges in Arabic-language ingroup references are merely temporary exceptions to this general rule.

Within the geographically proximate countries other than Iraq and Israel, the relative intensity of ingroup cues about Iraq varies not only by original language, but also by type of news medium. Figure 9 shows that rates of ingroup cues were relatively muted in print and Internet news sources throughout the period under consideration. In contrast, broadcast sources from Iraq’s geographic neighbors (excluding Israel) carried relatively high levels of ingroup mentions in Iraq coverage from well before President Bush ever spoke to the United Nations about his intention to use military force. This high RIID level in broadcast coverage from the region began to decline after the U.S. Congress voted to authorize force, so that by the time the invasion ended, rates of ingroup mentions were relatively similar across media in the Middle East. The only subsequent exception was during the weeks leading up to the release of the Abu Ghraib photos, when regional broadcast coverage surged once again with relatively elevated rates of ingroup mentions. Notably, RIID levels in print coverage about Iraq during this same period fell into negative values, indicating that newspapers and magazines from the Middle East was especially unlikely to use ingroup mentions when discussing Iraqi news topics around the time of the Abu Ghraib scandal. So although Abu Ghraib prompted a surge of RIID levels in broadcast news from the Middle East, the negative RIID levels in print news during the same period leave a misleading aggregate impression that no surge in ingroup discourse occurred at all (as suggested in Figure 1). Here, we find that the surge happened only in broadcast media, and contrary to the impression left by aggregated data from earlier figures, it was quite loud.

INSERT FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE
Conclusions

Despite the longevity of the ingroup-outgroup hypothesis, quantitative research has seen limited success in applying it to understanding the dimensions of interstate conflict. Mostly, this is because prior quantitative studies have tended to look for evidence in the outcomes of social conflicts rather than in the processes that stoke them. Our paper introduces a more nuanced and empirically sensitive method for identifying the ingroup-outgroup dynamics that contribute to conflict processes. Our analysis of FBIS data capturing print, broadcast, and Internet media reporting from more than 130 countries around the world allows us to identify the ingroup references that signal whether any given “we” has a stake in any particular conflict.

Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” hypothesis claims that social conflict is increasingly structured at the level of cultures rather than ideologies or nation-states. If true, then the ingroup discourse surrounding the 2003 invasion of Iraq should reveal a common cultural response to military aggression against one member of the culture. This first-ever study of worldwide social conflict discourse found no consistent evidence that this military clash produced a civilization-level response in news coverage about the conflict.

The clearest test of Huntington’s thesis came from our analysis of the referents of ingroup mentions across five country groups. Even within Iraq and among its geographically proximate neighbors, the ingroup references that dominated ingroup discourse were consistently drawn at the level of nation-states. Contrary to Huntington’s argument, few of the most common ingroup referents could be clearly traced to culture-level constructs.

The next strongest piece of evidence regarding Huntington’s thesis came from our analysis of ingroup discourse emanating from Western countries with media systems known to be free of government interference. There was no common dynamic in patterns of ingroup discourse about Iraq among Western nations. Even among Western countries with especially close cultural ties, dynamic
patterns of ingroup discourse about the Iraq invasion tended to be country-specific rather than
culture-specific.

A third test of Huntington’s thesis—our analysis of ingroup discourse from countries that were
geographically proximate to Iraq—yielded mixed results. There were some common patterns in
Middle Eastern responses to the Iraq invasion. But the focus of ingroup discourse was narrowly
confined to Arabic-language broadcasts rather than the broader mix of media and languages
emanating from this part of the world. The evidence suggests instead that mediated ingroup discourse
in most of the Middle East is tightly controlled by authoritarian regimes who appear more interested
in dampening than exciting the enthusiasm of their populations against Western culture. The ironic
result is that the relative intensity of ingroup discourse about Iraq tended to be more than twice as
high within Arabic-language broadcasts from Israel than within Arabic-language broadcasts
emanating from the predominantly Muslim countries in geographic proximity to Iraq. This confound
between culture and regime type complicated our test of the “clash of civilizations” among Iraq’s
mostly Islamic neighbors. A second confound affecting evidence from the Middle East was that
ingroup discourse tended to be periodically elevated in Arabic-language news broadcasts but mostly
tepid in other news media and languages produced by Iraq’s geographically proximate neighbors.

If Huntington’s thesis is correct, we would expect significant differences in emotional reaction
to the invasion among neighboring nations and those backing the United States. Arab countries
would spring to Iraq’s defense, while Western allies would back the call for war. In fact, we find
nearly the opposite. An editorial in the Saudi Riyadh Daily leading up to the war titled “It’s up to
Iraq” notes that the “ball has been bluntly chucked into the Iraqi court” after a recent UN meeting
and that the government’s “goose was cooked the day it invaded Kuwait.” Rather than starkly
opposing the war, the article argues that Iraq must take note of the global “resolve…to ensure the
country poses no threat to the region and that by relinquishing its weapons ambitions, Iraq could divert much-needed funds to areas of economic development and nation building.”\textsuperscript{25} Another Saudi editorial the same day calls Iraq’s government a “sick regime.”\textsuperscript{26} Many reports expressed support for Iraq, but did so situated in the context of US exploitation of Iraq’s oil resources, and the possibility that the invasion could lead to instability beyond Iraq. An Iranian radio broadcast perhaps said it best when it began by speaking against the possible invasion of Iraq by the US and comparing it to another “Vietnam,” but continuing by calling the Iraqi government illegitimate and its leader a “recalcitrant war criminal who had betray[ed] … the Iraqi nation and his neighbours” and expressed its desire for his departure.\textsuperscript{27} In essence, the Arab world was concerned about an invasion and the effect it could have on the region, but at the same time expressed its optimism that the region would be a better place without Saddam, comparing it with Japan prior to World War II and the success it has enjoyed since.\textsuperscript{28}

In summary, our analysis reveals that ingroup discourse about a major international conflict increases among belligerents, neighbors, and bystanders alike. Heightened levels of ingroup discourse were no more likely in the immediate geographic vicinity of Iraq than in areas far from the site of the conflict. Levels of ingroup discourse tended to be dynamic rather than static over the course of a conflict in every grouping that appeared in our analysis. Ingroup discourse is often triggered by major decision phases and events related to the military conflict itself, but there are few common patterns in the dynamics of ingroup discourse across countries. Instead, it appears that the primary determinants of peaks and valleys in ingroup discourse may be national conversations occurring at the level of individual countries.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{25} It’s up to Iraq. (2002, November 10). Riyadh Daily. As reported in FBIS.
\item\textsuperscript{26} Al-Rashid, Abd-al-Rahman. (2002, November 10). Why Rescue a Regime That Will Not Save Itself? Arab News. As reported in FBIS.
\item\textsuperscript{27} Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran Radio 1. (2003, March 2, 1030 GMT). As reported in FBIS.
\item\textsuperscript{28} It’s up to Iraq. (2002, November 10). Riyadh Daily. As reported in FBIS.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Few international relations theories have captured the attention of policymakers around the world as Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” hypothesis, because the human stakes of such an apocalyptic scenario are so high. The scholarly stakes are also high, as Huntington’s thesis raises important questions about “whether civilizations are the root cause of interstate conflict, or whether the causes of conflict are primarily political and economic institutions, norms, and practices that are amenable to change” (Russett, Oneal, and Cox 2000: 587). Previous analyses of interstate conflict patterns found little evidence to support Huntington’s argument, but the rarity of militarized conflicts made the quantitative evidence less than fully convincing. This study offered a different approach to the problem.

A “clash of civilizations” should be readily observable within patterns of social discourse that focus individual attention onto larger social problems of concern to an ingroup. But news coverage about international conflicts is rarely examined systematically by international relations scholars, and to our knowledge no previous study has looked for social identity discourse within news coverage about an interstate conflict. Although identifying patterns of social identity cues is not the same as identifying the effects of those cues on individuals or groups, the patterns revealed in our analysis paint a relatively consistent picture. The key question is whether ingroup responses to international conflicts happen collectively at the level of cultures, regions, or nations. Huntington says cultures. The findings presented here suggest that while cultures almost certainly have a role in shaping ingroup-outgroup processes, nations matter more.
References


Studeman, William. 1992. Teaching the Giant to Dance: Contradictions and Opportunities in Open Source Within the Intelligence Community. In First International Symposium on Open Source Solutions.


Table 1: Important Events Before and After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>September 12, 2002</td>
<td>U.S. President George W. Bush signals intention to invade Iraq in speech to the United Nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>October 16, 2002</td>
<td>U.S. Congress votes to authorize the use of military force against Iraq.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>May 1, 2003</td>
<td>End of major combat operations for Iraq invasion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>December 13, 2003</td>
<td>Saddam Hussein is captured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>April 24, 2004</td>
<td>Abu Ghraib torture photographs are released.</td>
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Figure 1: Intensity of Ingroup Discourse about Iraq Relative to Ingroup Discourse about Other Topics for Combatants and Countries Geographically Proximate to Iraq
Figure 2: Intensity of Ingroup Discourse about Iraq Relative to Ingroup Discourse about Other Topics for All Other Countries

Lowess bandwidth = .1
Table 2: Most Frequent Nouns Adjacent to an Ingroup Pronoun, by Country Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Noun</th>
<th>All Other Countries</th>
<th>Military Forces During Invasion</th>
<th>Military Forces After Invasion</th>
<th>Geographically Proximate</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
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Figure 3: Intensity of Ingroup Discourse about Iraq Relative to Ingroup Discourse about Other Topics for Four Commonwealth Countries
Figure 4: Within-Country Intensity of Ingroup Discourse about Iraq Relative to Ingroup Discourse about Other Topics during the Buildup Phase
Figure 5: Within-Country Intensity of Ingroup Discourse about Iraq Relative to Ingroup Discourse about Other Topics during the Invasion Phase
Figure 6: Within-Country Intensity of Ingroup Discourse about Iraq Relative to Ingroup Discourse about Other Topics during the Post-Invasion Phase.
Figure 7: Relative Intensity of Ingroup Discourse about Iraq by Language and News Medium for Iraq, Israel, and Other Geographically Proximate Countries

a. Iraq

b. Israel

c. All Other Geographically Proximate Countries
Figure 8: Intensity of Ingroup Discourse about Iraq Relative to Ingroup Discourse about Other Topics by Language, for Countries Geographically Proximate to Iraq (Excluding Iraq and Israel)
Figure 9: Intensity of Ingroup Discourse about Iraq Relative to Ingroup Discourse about Other Topics by News Medium (Excluding Iraq and Israel)